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The Determinants of Audit Prices for
Financial Services Institutions
in the United States
Kevin Swanson
ABSTRACT. Several studies have sought to establish the link between the characteristics
of a corporation and the audit fees charged by its auditor. Many studies have tried to
discover whether auditor specialization affects audit fees. Other research has attempted
to discover the effects of government regulation on fees. The impact of risk on audit fees
has also been examined, but has proved to be an elusive topic. This study uses regression
analysis to examine the effect of size and financial position on audit fees. The model
shows a direct relationship between measures of both assets and revenues and the audit
fees that firms are charged.

I. Introduction
Financial statement audits, hereafter referred to as audits, on public
corporations within the United States have a profound effect on the
reliability and availability of financial information. The Securities Acts
of 1933 and 1934 require every corporation registered with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to undergo an annual audit
of its financial statements by an independent registered public accounting
firm. The annual set of financial statements filed with the SEC, known
as a Form 10-K, is completed and made available to all shareholders,
prospective investors, and the general public via the SEC and the
individual corporation. Audited financial statements are important
because they are the source of financial measures used by stockbrokers
and analysts to evaluate financial performance. Audited financial
statements give analysts and investors greater faith in the validity of the
financial statements. The importance of the statements suggests that
measures of size and financial performance will affect the audit fees
charged to clients of the Big 4 public accounting firms.

II. Background
Audits are regulated by government agencies such as the SEC. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 created the Public Company Accounting
1
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Oversight Board (PCAOB) and increased the regulation of financial
reporting for auditors and corporations. The professional audit standards,
as applied to public corporations, are governed by the PCAOB. An audit
requires an independent public accounting firm to express an opinion
about the validity of representations made by a company’s management
on its financial statements. In order to express an opinion, auditors
examine evidence and evaluate the accounting methods and estimates
used by management for financial reporting (PCAOB, 2004). Audits
involve testing transactions, interviewing and observing the client, and
evaluating the internal controls and systems used within the corporation.
Due to the annual requirements of the SEC and the amount of work
required to perform a financial statement audit in compliance with
PCAOB standards, audit fees represent a considerable expenditure for
corporations.
This paper asks whether measures of size and financial position affect
the pricing of audits for the 37 largest financial services institutions
audited by the four largest public accounting firms in the United States
(i.e. the Big 4). The sample of financial services institutions includes
health insurance corporations, property and casualty insurance
corporations, and banks. This study will use regression analysis to
develop an audit fee model to analyze the effects that corporate
characteristics had on audit fees for the fiscal year 2006. This will be
accomplished by exploring the relationship between audit fees and
measures of size and financial position of the companies.
It is as important for corporations to know that their corporate
structure and strategic decisions affect audit fees as it is for the auditor to
adequately understand and evaluate the liability risk associated with that
audit engagement. Auditors accept engagements to perform services and
issue an opinion on the representations of the financial statements. There
is, however, a great deal of risk associated with the process. An auditor
is liable to the corporation, its shareholders, and other foreseeable third
parties, such as banks or regulators, for its performance of the audit. An
inherent risk associated with the performance of financial statement
audits is that a material misstatement of the financial statements exists
and the auditor fails to detect it and then issues a positive opinion on the
statements. If an auditor performs the audit in accordance with PCAOB
standards, he is not responsible for misstatements in the financial
statements. If, however, the auditor does not follow the PCAOB
standards and fails to detect a material misstatement that results in
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damage to users of the statements, then the auditor can be held liable for
damages. For example, Enron had been falsely reporting its financial
position and operating results prior to its eventual collapse. Enron’s
auditor, Arthur Andersen, failed to adhere to the professional standards
of the time. Arthur Andersen was held liable for damages associated with
Enron, and that led to the dissolution of the firm. The PCAOB was
created after the Enron situation and has broadened the previous
professional standards. In effect, accounting firms can share liability with
their clients if they are negligent and fail to detect errors that should have
been detected. As Simunic and Stein (1996) state, “Because audit fees
cannot normally be adjusted ‘after the fact’ to cover actual litigation
and/or reputation losses, an auditor has a strong incentive to try to
minimize actual losses and to incorporate expected losses into the fees”
(120). Risk is difficult to quantify. This paper explains only the effects
of size and financial position on audit fees and does not directly establish
a quantifiable link between litigation risk and audit pricing.

III. Previous Empirical Contributions
A large body of research exists that addresses audit fees and their
determinants. Because the present study applies only to U.S. companies
audited by the four largest public accounting firms, much of the previous
research does not directly apply. For example, studies performed in other
countries on non-U.S. corporations reflect different regulatory and
judicial contexts. The fundamental differences in reporting requirements
and application of accounting principles change the requirements of
audits and the determination of audit fees. For example, studies such as
Ferguson et al. (2003) and Ferguson et al. (2006), analyze auditor pricing
and industry specialization in Australian markets, and are not applicable
to this study. Also, many studies analyze public sector pricing of audit
fees, such as for charities. These studies will not provide a sufficient
evidential link relating audit fees to risk factors due to the differences in
the operating environment and reporting requirements of these entities.
As previously mentioned, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) has
considerably changed the audit environment and liability associated with
the representations made on the financial statements of corporations.
SOX and new SEC regulations require the study to focus solely on the
audit environment existing after SOX took effect.
Casterella et al. (2004) provide an analysis of auditor industry
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specialization, client bargaining power, and audit fees. Casterella et al.
(2004) apply Porter’s (1985) analysis of competitive strategy to auditor
industry specialization by Big 6 (prior to mergers into the Big 4)
accounting firms in U.S. markets. Differentiation, or specialization, by
auditors will lead to higher audit fees. Their study finds that the
premiums paid to firms that specialize in certain industries are only
applicable to those clients with assets less than $123 million. This
conclusion is in contrast to the research performed outside of the U.S.
regarding industry specialization. Casterella et al. (2004) also show that
audit fees decrease as the client becomes larger in size relative to other
firms within that industry. Casterella et al. (2004) conclude that “larger
companies in the sample do not pay a premium for industry
specialization, but they do have lower fees as their bargaining power
increases” (135).
Francis and Wang (2005) study the impact of the SEC’s mandated
public disclosure of audit fees in the year 2000 on subsequent period audit
fees. They found that mandating public disclosure of audit fees leads to
greater pricing precision of audit services and has a profound effect on the
audit market. Francis and Wang found that audit fees have a significantly
lower variance in the year subsequent to mandated public disclosure.
They conclude that clients who were initially overcharged for audit
services in 2000 saw a reduction in their fees paid in 2001, and clients
who were undercharged initially paid higher fees in the subsequent
period. However, the upward adjustment to the undercharged clients was
less than the downward adjustment of overcharged clients. The result
makes sense as clients will be reluctant to pay higher fees for the same
services that they have received in the past. Francis and Wang also
conclude that the fee adjustment process was completed by the second
year after the public disclosure requirement took effect. The research
finds that public fee disclosure results in greater precision of audit
pricing.
Fields et al. (2003) investigate audit pricing for 277 banking
institutions in the U.S. They adapted an audit pricing model used for
manufacturing firms by introducing measures of risk and complexity that
are more appropriate for banks. The study incorporates variables that
deal directly with the regulatory structure and include ratios related to
deposits, commercial and mortgage loans, and charge-offs for nonperforming loans that are exclusive to the banking industry. The purpose
is to develop an audit pricing model that can explain audit fees and
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investigate the consistency between government regulations and the
variables used by accounting firms to price audits. Fields et al. (2003)
conclude that banks with more transactions accounts, fewer securities as
a percentage of total assets, lower levels of efficiency, and higher degrees
of credit risk are charged higher audit fees (69). Also, savings
institutions, banks actively involved in acquisition activity, and banks
with a higher required level of risk adjusted capital also generate higher
audit fees. Their model concludes that the risks addressed by regulatory
bodies are consistent with the risks that are priced by public accounting
firms. Interestingly, Fields et al. (2003) draw a distinction between the
larger banks with total assets above $1.2 billion in their sample. The
larger banks have characteristics that cause the price of their audit to
differ from that of smaller banks. Mortgage loans, intangible assets, and
volume of transactions accounts all have a significant positive effect on
audit fees for large banks, but not for banks with assets less than $1.2
billion. Securities as a percentage of total assets did not have a
significant effect for large banks. That suggests that larger institutions
rely less on securities for meeting financial obligations.
Simunic and Stein (1996) provide an overview of the economics and
impact of litigation risk pricing on audits. The economic considerations
implicit in audit fees are described in the following passage:
In a competitive market equilibrium, fees will equal the
economic costs including a normal profit incurred by
efficient suppliers of the various service qualities. When
considering auditors’ costs, two issues need to be
considered: the client specific nature of audit costs, and
the fact that total audit costs include a resource cost and
an expected liability loss component (121).
As size, complexity, and risk affect audit pricing, Simunic and Stein
purport that a more comparable increase in audit fees across clients is a
result of an increase in assurance provided by the audit. They also
discuss the inverse relationship between the resource costs and expected
liability losses. An increase in resource costs represents an increase in the
amount of work, or effort, devoted to the audit. It follows that as the level
of effort increases, the expected liability loss should decrease. The
regulations and standards that must be met, however, blur this logic. If
an auditor increases resource costs but still fails to meet the required level
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of work, he has not necessarily reduced any expected liability loss.
Simunic and Stein argue that an increase in the level of effort reduces the
probability of performing an audit that does not conform to PCAOB
standards.
Simunic and Stein (1996) also discuss the quality of audit services by
Big 6 and non-Big 6 auditors. Big 6 auditors are assumed to provide
higher quality services as a result of the greater amount of wealth at risk
during an audit engagement than for non-Big 6 firms. As a result of
having more wealth at risk, Big 6 firms will expend greater effort to
insure a greater quality of audit services. That, in turn, will increase audit
fees. Another issue addressed by Simunic and Stein in the following
passage is the increase in a liability regime faced by Big 6 firms:
To summarize, a change in liability regime which
imposes relatively greater costs on the Big 6 firms as
potential “deep pocket” defendants will tend to shift
demand away from these firms to lower quality levels of
attestation because Big 6 audits may cease to be net
benefit maximizing for some clients (123).
The increase in fees related to audit services for the same level of quality
may cause clients to move services to non-Big 6 firms. Simunic and Stein
conclude that an increase in litigation exposure increases the costs of Big
6 firms, so more risky clients will shift their needs away from the Big 6.
The empirical results based on studies in the U.S. show that audit fees
reflect litigation risk and that the amounts are sufficient to cover the risks.
The empirical results confirm previous conclusions regarding the
economics of audit pricing. Although this study was done prior to the
current audit environment, the basic economics of pricing audits has not
changed. Only the methods used to evaluate the liability loss exposure,
not litigation risk itself, have changed.
Peter Williams (2003) wrote an article discussing the effect that
Deloitte & Touche’s resignation from a major client in London has had
on the audit industry. Williams acknowledges that the event of an auditor
resigning from a client is a rarity in the audit industry. The article
addresses the issues that public accounting firms must deal with when
deciding to accept or reject certain clients. He believes that an audit firm
walking away from a client is a signal to the market about the reliability
of that firm’s financial statements. Williams mainly discusses the
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decision for firms to accept a level of risk or simply resign.

IV. Model
It is important for a corporation to know how its corporate structure and
operating results affect audit fees. The model seeks to establish a link
between basic measures of size and audit fees charged to the top 37
financial services institutions in the U.S.
Many empirical studies incorporate the same variables in their studies
to explain as much of the audit fees as possible. There is little
disagreement that the size of a client has some affect on audit fees
charged by Big 4 firms. I include three measures of firm size: total assets,
sales revenue, and the number of employees of the client. A measure of
firm performance and financial position is also included with a variable
measuring net income. Most existing research also considers whether the
firm earned a profit or loss for the year, the type of opinion issued by the
accounting firm (unqualified, qualified, or adverse), and the number of
business segments. All sample firms are profitable, which suggests that
financial distress is not an omitted variable. Similarly, all opinions issued
on the financial statements in the sample were “unqualified”, or positive
opinions. Business segments refer to the number of subsidiaries and/or
product divisions within the corporation. As the number of business
segments is a measure of size, I limit the model to the variables of size
mentioned earlier. Berkshire Hathaway, Fifth Third Bancorp, and the
Bank of New York were left out of the analysis due to unavailable
information.
The first variable tested is the natural log of total assets for each
corporation. Total assets are a measure of size, and it follows that as the
size of a corporation increases, the audit fees will increase. Therefore, a
positive relationship to audit fees is expected. The natural log of sales
revenue, another measure of size, is used to incorporate a measure that
reflects the size of operations for one year. Total assets are accumulated
over time and can be attributed to revenue in many periods. However,
sales revenue measures revenue earned only in the fiscal year 2006. This
is also expected to yield a positive relationship with audit fees. As sales
revenues increase, the number of transactions likely increases and thus the
amount of audit testing and effort will increase. The number of
employees for the client is another measure of risk that could have an
effect on audit fees. As the number of employees increases, the amount
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of work performed during the audit of internal control would typically
rise. For example, auditors may have to travel to more client locations,
the time to obtain adequate documentation may increase, and the
complexity of transactions is likely to increase. Net income reported by
these companies is used to measure the operating results and financial
position of these firms for the fiscal year 2006. Net income represents the
overall result of revenues and gains net of expenses and losses. As net
income increases, the return that the company is generating from
operations also increases. This variable creates a unique ethical issue
when included in the analysis. If auditors are able to make suggestions
that affect net income and subsequently charge fees related to net income,
then the possibility of impropriety in audit pricing exists. Thus, in order
to mitigate this perception, firms should not use net income to determine
audit pricing and this variable should not be significant in my regression.
The data obtained for this analysis were compiled from the SEC and
CompuStat. The SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and
Retrieval (EDGAR) system provided access to each corporation’s audit
fees for fiscal year 2006. CompuStat is a database that collects
information on all public companies and provided all of the financial and
qualitative information with the exception of audit fees. Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) was used to find the relationship between the dependent
variable and the independent variables, and is reported in the following
equation:
Y = 6.6168 – 0.37280(X1) + 0.83282(X2) – 0.35638(X3) – 0.51676E-1(X4)
Y
X1
X2
X3
X4

=
=
=
=
=

Natural log of Audit Fees (LOGFEE)
Natural log of Total Assets (LOGAST)
Natural log of Sales Revenue (LOGSAL)
Natural log of Net Income (LGNETIN)
Natural Log of number of employees (LGEMPL)

V. Results
The equation above provides estimates of the size and signs of the
coefficients. One must also consider the statistical significance
associated with each of the variables. Below is a table that outlines the
statistical results of the OLS regression.

Table of Regression Results
Dependent Variable = LOGFEE
Audit Fees a

Variable

Natural Log of Total Assets

b

Natural Log of Sales Revenue
Natural Log of Net Income

b

Natural Log of Employees b

Estimated
Coefficient

T-Ratio

PValue

LOGAST

0.37280

2.969

0.006

LOGSAL

0.83282

3.757

0.001

LGNETIN

-0.35638

-1.784

0.084

LGEM PL

-0.51676E-01

-0.3063

0.761

6.6168

5.050

0.000

Shazam Name

b

CONSTANT

R 2 = 0.7419

N = 37
dF = 31

ADJ R 2 = 0.7097
Sources for Data

a. SEC Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR)
b. CompuStat

F = 7451.06
P-Value = .000
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The table above shows the relationships found when regressing the
independent variables against the dependent variable, LOGFEE. It shows
that LOGAST and LOGSAL are both statistically significant at the 5
percent level. With t-ratios greater than +/-2 and p-values less than .050,
these variables have a significant impact on audit fees. Consistent with
the discussion above, net income is not a significant variable in this
analysis. The ethical issue of firms charging fees related to results that
the auditor approves is not evidenced by this model. The number of
employees also is insignificant. This result contradicts the discussion
above. The result, however, may suggest that the nature of the audited
transactions and the systems processing those transactions has a greater
impact on the amount of work to be performed than the number of
employees involved. Ultimately, these four variables were able to explain
approximately 71 percent of the audit fees charged to the 37 largest
financial services institutions in the United States in 2006. The F-value
of 22.998 from the mean is significantly smaller than the F-value of
7451.06 from zero, which indicates that the R2 is statistically different
from zero.
The only transformations performed were using the natural log of the
dependent and independent variables. This is common in OLS and is
important for two reasons. First, the use of the natural log reduces the
issue of heteroskedasticity. The use of natural logs also provides a better
fit for outliers within the distribution. Squaring of other variables and
variables in the study was attempted but did not yield any significant
results. Various other variables such as price/earnings ratio, percentage
change in price/earnings ratio, earnings per share, and number of
employees were used but yielded no significant results.

VI. Limitations
A concern about this study is how to account for the difference among
pricing strategies of each of the Big 4 public accounting firms. Dummy
variables for each accounting firm were tested separately but did not have
a significant effect on audit fees. The model, therefore, concludes that
there is not a statistical difference in the audit pricing structure among Big
4 public accounting firms. This reflects the completion of the adjustment
in audit fee pricing structure that Francis and Wang (2005) demonstrated.
Also, with only 37 observations, the ability to incorporate a large number
of independent variables is reduced. Nevertheless, the results show that
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a relationship between measures of size and audit fees is present.

VII. Conclusion
Measures of size do have an affect on the price of audit services in the
U.S. financial services industry. Simunic and Stein (1996), as previously
noted, conclude that measures of risk are important in audit pricing
because of the risk of litigation against an auditor. Auditors include in
audit fees amounts designed to compensate for the litigation risk of the
audit. Also, Casterella et al. (2004) conclude that claims of auditor
industry specialization having an effect on audit pricing does not hold for
U.S. corporations with assets greater than $123 million. Auditors have
a choice to make when accepting/continuing engagements. That choice
reflects the decision to accept an engagement and its associated risk or to
choose not to perform services for that client. As a result, each audit must
be priced such that it can compensate the auditor for the risk assumed in
performing those audit services. As the above model shows, financial
measures of size have a significant effect on audit pricing. This model,
however, cannot quantify the amount of pricing related to the risk of the
audit. Risk is still an important issue within the auditing community, but
many other factors play a role in determining audit fees. As mentioned
earlier, audit expenditures can be relatively small or quite large.
Management has control over the capital structure and operating
procedures of the corporation that have an impact on audit fees and can
use models like this to understand what factors led to the fees charged
annually by their auditor.
Improvements can be made to this study by increasing the number of
observations so that an increased number of independent variables can be
used, That would provide better evidence. Also, the current mortgage
crisis and collapse of significant corporations is sure to increase audit
fees. With an expansion of the study, it should be possible to better
predict the impact of choices of management on audit fees and financial
performance.
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